Will the Iran conflict draw in other nations? It's beginning to look likely...

 

We've heard rumors that Kurds in other Middle Eastern nations - Iraq, Syria and even possibly Turkey - may support Iranian Kurds if they stage an uprising to make their enclave independent of Iran.  Some fear that's a pipe dream that will never materialize (see, for example, this article from the Daily Telegraph).  Others think there's more to it.  In particular, Larry Lambert (who blogs at Virtual Mirage) has been to Iraqi Kurdistan recently, and is an adviser to its leaders (see his detailed background article for more information).  In a comment to a recent article by Lawdog, he had this to say.

I've been to Kurdistan, spoken with the Barzanis within the year, and worked there, so there is credibility to the extent that my observations are valid. I didn't travel to Iran to meet with the Iranian Kurds. As you point out, all of the Kurdish regions in Syria, Turkey, Barzani and Talibani in Iraq, and the Kurds in Iran have different political bents and different tribal affiliations. Some are hardcore opium growers and marketers, some have more oil, and in all cases, they are "Assyrians" culturally, which separates them from Arabs and Persians. Israel gets along with the Kurds more than just in an enemy of my enemy framework.

I'm certain that the Trump Administration promised the Kurds their "freedom" in exchange for "boots on the ground." Having run with them recently, that is the promise that would turn the trick. The US forces recently withdrawn from Syria were redeployed to Erbil to backfill for the Peshmerga who had deployed. The huge base in Erbil rarely makes the news, but it is significant, and the just-opened US Consulate in Erbil is the largest in the world.

. . .

... an open US recognition of a Kurdish state as free and independent will drop a turd in the punch.

There's more at the link.

So, it appears to be more than a remote possibility that Iranian Kurds, probably supported to a certain extent by Kurds from across the Middle East, may indeed rise up against the Iranian government.  What makes this even more likely are developments in Azerbaijan, on Iran's northern border.  The BBC reports:

Azerbaijan has said it is pulling its diplomatic staff out of Iran after it accused Iran of launching four drones across the border into the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan ... Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev condemned the "act of terror", demanding an explanation and apology from Tehran.

On Friday he went further, announcing the withdrawal of staff from Azerbaijan's embassy in Tehran and consulate in Tabriz "for their own safety", and state media said the military had been placed on maximum combat readiness.

Aliyev also touched on Iran's ethnic Azerbaijani population on Thursday - a sensitive subject for Tehran ... his anger went beyond words, saying that "independent Azerbaijan is a place of hope for Azerbaijanis living in Iran".

Baku has long avoided this line because of how sensitive it is for Tehran.

Iran is home to an estimated 20-25 million ethnic Azeris, who make up its largest minority group and are concentrated in the north-west along the Azerbaijan border.

The Islamic Republic has consistently regarded their identity and political affiliations as issues of utmost sensitivity. Tehran views any notion of Azerbaijani identity extending beyond its borders as a potential challenge to internal unity.

Aliyev has rarely spoken about Iranian Azeris in such explicitly aspirational terms and doing so now appears to be a calculated move.

. . .

[Iranian Azeris] are also a politically significant community. This week the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, has been urging Iranian Azerbaijanis, among other ethnic minorities, to rise up against the regime.

. . .

Despite their shared Shia Muslim identity, Iran and Azerbaijan have grown apart politically, and tensions worsened after Azerbaijan's military victories in the 2020 and 2023 Karabakh wars, which were helped by Turkish and Israeli-made weapons.

Iran views Baku's close defence partnership with Israel as a serious threat.

Iranian officials and media have repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of helping Israeli intelligence operate along Iran's northern frontier - claims Azerbaijan denies.

Azerbaijan's ties with Israel extend beyond security. Israel relies heavily on Azerbaijani oil, and the two countries maintain close political and intelligence co-operation.

For Tehran, this collaboration is at the centre of its suspicion.

Azerbaijan, for its part, has long resented Iran's political and military support for neighbouring Armenia, seeing it as direct interference in a conflict central to its own security.

That history of mistrust is an important backdrop to Thursday's escalation, shaping how Baku interprets every move coming from Tehran.

. . .

Aliyev's decision to talk openly of Azerbaijan being a "place of hope" for Iranian Azeris introduces a new and potentially unpredictable element.

Aliyev has pointed out to Tehran that he was the sole foreign leader to visit any Iranian embassy to express condolences following the killing of Khamenei, and that he personally responded to a request to help evacuate Iranian embassy staff from Lebanon.

Now, he says, Iran has repaid those gestures with drone strikes on Azerbaijani territory, something he views as a deep betrayal.

Again, more at the link.

The Associated Press added more details.

President Ilham Aliyev accused Iran of carrying out “a groundless act of terror and aggression,” and said his military has been told to prepare and implement retaliatory measures. The Caspian Sea nation halted truck traffic across the nearly 700-kilometer (over 400-mile) border with Iran.

. . .

[Aliyev] said Azerbaijan’s military has been instructed “to prepare and implement retaliatory measures.”

The Defense Ministry vowed that Iran’s “attacks will not go unanswered,” adding it was preparing the “necessary response” to protect “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country, ensure the safety of civilians and civilian infrastructure.” It didn’t elaborate.

Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan “is not participating in operations against Iran -– neither previously nor this time -– and will not do so.”

He added: “We have neither interest in conducting any operations against neighboring countries, nor does our policy allow it.”

More at the link.

I need hardly point out that "not participating in operations against Iran" doesn't exactly square with the Azerbaijani military's being "instructed to prepare and implement retaliatory measures".  Cognitive dissonance, much?

Furthermore, if Iranian Kurds rise up against the government, consider what Iranian Azeris might do.  After all, many of their ethnic leaders have been oppressed by the Iranian government, including imprisonment, harassment, censorship and other measures.  Regardless of what the Azerbaijan government does, perhaps some Iranian Azeris might be inspired by a Kurdish uprising to launch one of their own;  and if they do, can Azerbaijan - which regards itself as the homeland and leader of all Azeris - stand idly by and do nothing, thereby potentially threatening its self-proclaimed ethnic leadership?

Finally, note that US Vice-President Vance is currently visiting both Armenia and Azerbaijan, two nations that recently fought a war with each other and are still at daggers drawn.  If the threat of renewed hostilities between them can be negotiated away, or at least reduced, that will allow Azerbaijan to focus its attention - and its military - elsewhere . . . towards Iran, perhaps?  Might Vice-President Vance be discussing that matter in suitably diplomatic language?

So, the US appears to be encouraging an uprising by Iran's Kurds, and Azerbaijan is making nice with Israel and the USA - both allied with each other against Iran - in the face of Iranian terrorism and suppression of its large Azeri population.  If both subsets of Iran's people were to rise up and support each other, probably - almost certainly - with military support from the USA and Israel, what would this mean to Iran?  It would become a three-sided onslaught against that nation.  Could the current regime there survive that?

I'm speculating, of course:  but if one looks at the news articles and commentary above, and reads between the lines, and puts two and two together, the picture that emerges is one that should make the Iranian government very worried indeed.  At least, that's the way I see it.

Peter