"Have we been under attack from China and didn’t know it?"

 

That's the $64,000 question from American Thinker as it analyzes the recent defection of a senior Chinese official.  The article raises several critical issues.

Dong Jingwei is a Chinese defector working with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He served as Vice Minister of State Security in the Chinese Ministry of Defense.  Before defecting, he was responsible for the counterintelligence efforts in China.  He was in a position to know about all things “espionage” in China and is perhaps the highest-level Chinese defector the U.S. has ever had.  Even though the legacy media is playing it down, this is a big deal.

It speaks volumes that the man who knows the identity of all the Chinese spies in our country chose to defect to the DIA and only the DIA.  Further, it’s reported that the DIA is not sharing the information it’s receiving with the FBI or CIA.  Now, why would that be?

Dong provided details of meetings between U.S. officials, Chinese spies, and Russian SVR agents.  He also provided details about how the Chinese government gained access to CIA communications, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of CIA assets.  Anonymous sources are also reporting that members of the federal law enforcement community (i.e. FBI) are “scared s**tless” about Dong’s information. 

Is it possible that the FBI and CIA are hopelessly compromised?  As we’d say in Minnesota -- you betcha!

Dong has allegedly provided the names of Chinese spies working or attending universities in the U.S.  He claims that a third of Chinese students in this country are actually PLA assets.  To validate his claims, Dong has provided financial records showing which businessmen and public officials have received money from the Chinese Government.

. . .

In 2015, the Aviation Industry Corp of China (AVIC) acquired Henniges Automotive.  This acquisition is significant because Henniges Automotive provides stealth technology for the F-35 program.  AVIC’s U.S. partners in this acquisition were none other than Hunter Biden and Chris Heinz.  The acquisition was approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  Secretary of State John Kerry was a member of the CFIUS during this decision.  He is also the stepfather of -- surprise, surprise -- Chris Heinz!  Dong provided details of how China was able to acquire stealth technology after the U.S. approved its purchase of Henniges Automotive.

. . .

Given what we’re learning about Dr. Fauci and his “gain of function” research, we may have paid China to develop a weapon that was used against us.

Further, the Chinese government changed the travel plans of Chinese students returning to the U.S. after the Christmas break. Their travel plans were advanced so that they returned much earlier than originally planned -- prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.  Dong reportedly claimed that they were tasked to gather information about the U.S. response to the pandemic ... The implication is that even if the Chinese government did not intentionally release the virus, they intentionally let it spread and used it as an espionage bonanza.

There's more at the link.

Given that President Biden and his family are known to have made millions (if not billions) of dollars from their past connection to China, one can only speculate about the extent to which China may control their current policies, decisions and actions.  However, I do find it very telling that Mr. Dong chose one specific agency to which to defect.  He ignored the "traditional" route for defectors of the CIA or the FBI.  I can only presume there were very good reasons for that . . . like, perhaps, that he knew which agencies were compromised, and which were not?  That may speak well of the DIA, and not at all well of the others.

There's also the question of what, if anything, will be done with Mr. Dong's information.  If the Biden administration can't be trusted to act upon it, who will?  And what if the powers that be insist that the DIA hand him over to another agency for further interrogation?  If I were Mr. Dong, knowing what he presumably does about those other agencies, I'd have insisted on ironclad safeguards before talking to anybody - including, perhaps, a location beyond their reach.  He, of all people, would know where that might be, and what might be feasible and realistic.

Hmmm . . .

Peter