Prigozhin's death doesn't solve anything - it makes a lot of things worse

 

So Russian warlord Yevgeni Prigozhin is dead.  Hardly surprising (I, along with almost every other commenter, predicted that after his abortive coup attempt two months ago).  The only unexpected thing about it is that it took Russia's President Putin this long to arrange it.  I note that most of the Wagner Group leadership were also on the plane.  Perhaps he was waiting to collect all their scalps at one fell swoop.  (However, I'm sorry for the crew of the aircraft, which was provided by a private agency.  If I'd been any one of them, I'd have resigned immediately rather than serve on board Prigozhin's aircraft, because I'd have been very aware of his diminished life expectancy, and wouldn't have wanted mine to diminish along with his.)

So . . . what next?

• Ukraine had found the Wagner Group to be a thorn in its side on the battlefield.  Wagner was more aggressive, more ruthless and more determined than most of the Russian armed forces in its attacks.  Ukraine will be hoping that the surviving Wagner forces will disintegrate after the death of their founder, or at the very least become less effective if they're forced under Russian military control as just another unit.  I'm not so sure about either expectation.  Time will tell.  On the other hand, if I were wearing Wagner patches on my uniform (particularly if I held middle- to senior-level rank in that organization), I'd know that will automatically make my loyalty suspect as far as Putin and his FSB are concerned.  I might be more likely to find myself used as convenient cannon fodder rather than trusted to make a meaningful contribution to the war effort.
• Wagner Group has literally tens of thousands of fighters deployed in many countries, including several in Africa.  It's provided "security services" (i.e. thugs for hire) to more than a few questionable regimes, including perpetrating atrocities against local tribes and groups on behalf of ruling minorities.  It's also exploited natural resources, including gold and diamond mining, for its own benefit in payment for its services.  It's entrenched in those countries, and its operatives there won't want to go back to a Russia that may be less welcoming than they'd prefer.  What will become of them?  I suspect chaos and anarchy in the countries where they're deployed as Wagner puts its own interests ahead of its hosts'.
• I think any intelligence agency worth its salt must be trying with might and main to recruit "sources" among Wagner's employees, offering not just cash for information, but a "guaranteed" get-out-of-Russia escape route if Putin demonstrates further hostile intentions towards them or their organization.  Some of them are former Spetsnaz operators;  others are former KGB/FSB operatives;  still others are military veterans.  Anyone in those categories, particularly senior personnel, is likely to be a fount of useful information as to what's really going on inside Russia (including its attempts to bust sanctions), and the progress and future intentions of the Ukraine operation.  On the other hand, if I were in Russia's FSB, I'd be seriously thinking about "house-cleaning" any and all such potential traitors as a preemptive measure.  That would be nothing new for Russia, of course.  They've done it for centuries, long pre-dating the Communist regime of the defunct Soviet Union.
• As far as the average Russian is concerned, I'm not sure that this will bolster Putin's image as a decisive leader.  He should have moved against Prigozhin immediately after the latter's abortive coup attempt.  He didn't.  That was an unmistakeable indication of weakness to a Russian populace that's accustomed to ruthless, merciless leaders who won't tolerate opposition.  He's acted now - but will that be too late to restore his image in his people's eyes?  I suspect it will.  I think he's damaged himself by waiting this long.  Can he repair that damage?  We'll have to wait and see.
• I think there are enough Prigozhin loyalists, in Wagner and elsewhere, who will be left angry and bitter over his death.  I fully expect some of them to try to act against Putin and his puppets as a result.  Putin's inner circle is small, and there are few prospective successors waiting in the wings for any of them to die.  A few strategically directed assassination attempts could destabilize the central Russian government, at least temporarily, and offer opportunities to that country's enemies (including Ukraine).  The FSB and other Russian agencies will, of course, be on full alert to detect and stop such attacks;  but is the FSB itself fully reliable?  Can all its personnel be trusted?  After Prigozhin's mutiny, Putin's got to be wondering that right now.

Winston Churchill famously described the Soviet Union as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma".  Its successor, Russia today, is still that way.  Nobody knows for sure what Prigozhin's death will mean in the long term.  I suspect it's going to be more than a little interesting - in the sense of the fabled Chinese curse - to find out.

Pass the popcorn.

Peter