In a long and very detailed article, Lewis Page argues that "Britain’s next-generation fighter jet is a disaster in the making". He goes into detail on the background to the present project, and the aircraft that have preceded it in Royal Air Force service. It's far too long an article to reproduce here, so I've selected as an example just one cost comparison between the current front-line aircraft of the US and UK air forces.
The Eurofighter Typhoon, as flown by the RAF, is the most expensive tactical aircraft ever built by the human race. When the last Tranche 1 planes are gone next year (disposed of with half their lifetime hours unused) the RAF will possess 107 aircraft.
Recent statements reveal that the size of an RAF front-line squadron has fallen from 12 to “up to 10” jets. Officials have recently congratulated themselves that they typically have “65 to 70” Typhoons “available” nowadays for the seven RAF front-line Typhoon squadrons that exist on paper.
Some more Typhoons are in the training and test units but it’s clear that others, probably more than 20, are in a long-term un-flyable condition: in deep maintenance, with parts robbed from them to get others flying, or both.
Each of the 107 Typhoons, according to the National Audit Office, cost well over £215m to obtain in 2011 money, or around $355m (£264m) if we use contemporary exchange rates.
By comparison, the undisputed, most powerful fighter jet in the world is the US Air Force’s F-22 Raptor. Only 183 Raptors were made in the end, as opposed to the 600-plus Eurofighters so far.
But despite this much shorter production run and the fact that it is an entire generation more advanced than a Typhoon, the acquisition cost of one Raptor to the US taxpayer was somewhat lower than the cost of one Typhoon to the UK taxpayer. The Raptor throws into stark relief the almost unbelievably bad value for money offered by the Typhoon.
In short, the Typhoon was a procurement disaster.
There's much more at the link. Highly recommended reading for aviation and military enthusiasts.
The article helps us understand why military hardware has become so expensive. The deadweight of bureaucratic and political control interfered so much with the Typhoon's development, and the lack of vision among military leaders in making it a single-purpose rather than a multi-role aircraft, effectively doomed it to operational irrelevance for much of its service life. Furthermore, the astronomical costs of not just each aircraft, but spare parts to keep it flying, wasted so much of the Royal Air Force budget that funds were not available for different types of aircraft, or urgently needed upgrades. (For example, for the past two decades almost every major frontline strike fighter has had AESA radar, offering vastly improved performance over older types: but the RAF's Typhoons are only now beginning to get one - and, at that, only enough to fit to less than half the fleet. Without it, if they had had to fight against other modern fighters, they would have been at a huge disadvantage.)
I suppose we could draw parallels between Britain's fighters and the US Navy's ships. The USN has had so many problems developing new designs that it's had to scrap almost all of them as being too complex and/or too expensive, after its "experts" had spent years gold-plating them and adding every feature they could think of. It's now been forced to bodge together a "frigate" that is basically a slightly more heavily armed Coast Guard cutter, because the much more sophisticated Constellation class frigates have had to be abandoned due to their design becoming bogged down in excessive complexity. Will something similar happen to Britain's proposed new fighter aircraft? I think there's a very good chance that it will.
China is producing new aircraft and ship designs in multiples every year, and building them by the dozens. One hopes that both Britain and the USA will wake up to reality and start moving faster . . . but if the politicians insist on sticking their oar in, that's not very likely. Can Secretary of War Hegseth cut through the entrenched bureaucracy and layers of control that have bedeviled US military design? That remains to be seen.
Peter





