Weapons development: lessons from Ukraine

 

An interview suggests that old-style US defense manufacturers are ignoring lessons from Ukraine in rapid response to battlefield needs and fielding new designs in a hurry.  It's a long interview, with plenty of examples, and contains much food for thought.  Here's a key question and response.

Q: Talk a little bit about developing systems in combat and can you share any real-world examples of weapon systems tested in combat?

A: What is generally happening is that when somebody has an idea or somebody says, ‘Oh, there’s a need we’re going to build to fill it,’ before they ever go anywhere near the Ministry of Defense or anything for purchasing, they are working in tandem with a unit and constantly refining during the build process. And whether it’s refining the hardware, whether it’s refining the software, whatever it may be, all of this stuff is literally being built side-by-side with the military. So by the time it is ready to be purchased, it has already been fully tested. It’s build, test; build, test; build, test. It’s this constant cycle. 

One of the challenges that Ukraine has seen is that a lot of systems that are being sold or are ready for sale, they’ve hit what they’re calling their ready product. However, by the time they bring it to Ukraine, the systems have been closed. They did not build it in an environment that allowed for quick iteration, the fast changes that have to happen. So a lot of the systems that come in from the outside do not work. And it’s not that it’s bad tech in and of itself. It’s just that, and so many of these builds outside of Ukraine, I think, for most people, it’s just utterly unimaginable to build for the electronic warfare and the communications denied environment that exists here.

Q: What lessons does that offer for the U.S. when it comes to a potential conflict in Asia with China and the ability to adapt to what’s happening there? 

A: This is something that I am trying to talk about more, because it is so hard to understand from the outside and there definitely are implications for the United States. There are a couple of things. I think about this in four bullet points of things I really wish that the U.S. understood. 

So one is just truly the speed of iteration that happens here, and it’s both for the software and the hardware. And because you need to be able to adapt to everything that the Russians do – and I guarantee the Chinese would be exactly the same – in terms of the GPS-denied environments, in terms of being able to respond to the electromagnetic warfare that’s going on. You have to start with systems that are adaptable, and that can be changed. And it’s not going back to the factory that the soldiers themselves can do it. So that’s the iteration part. 

The second thing is, like you said, just the production, the scale of this stuff. Everything that the Ukrainians are using, for the most part, you know, the FPVs, maybe run $500 to $1,000, at most, if they’ve got really sophisticated components like nighttime cameras or something like that. The bigger fixed wings, maybe $10,000, though some of them are $30,000, but you know, those are even bumping up against the high point. And if you think about the scale, we’re talking about millions and millions of drones that are out there that are being used. You can’t have drones that are costing you $100,000, $200,000 a pop. 

So the third point is price. It’s the kind of production and the mass production, and also the price point that balances in that is extremely important. 

And then the fourth point is really the whole procurement process. And this is not in the hands of the producers or anything. I mean, this sits with congressional committees. It sits with the budgeting process. It sits with the Department of Defense in terms of how they’re going to buy things. But the traditional cycle for the DoD to be able to incorporate new technology is not speedy. It is not fast. It can take years. And even, like with Anduril and some of these new ones coming out, this is still not a super speedy cycle. The Ukrainians have done a couple of things that have just sort of been extraordinary and that I know can’t necessarily be reproduced exactly. But Ukraine completely revamped its official MoD procurement cycle, and it’s now down to three to four months. So once there is a product that has been battle tested, that they have proof from commanders out in the field that it works, they can now actually do procurement within about three months. The other thing is that they have given individual units – companies and battalions – their own budgets to be able to buy directly from an approved list of vendors that have already been put into the ecosystem. This speeds up the process because there’s no procurement in there. It’s a transaction that happens very, very quickly.

There's much more at the link.  Highly recommended reading.

I'm particularly interested because in South Africa, during its long border war, weapons development was often inspired by soldiers talking to friends in small companies, putting ideas into practical form, and then testing, improving and developing them into a combat-ready product.  Some of the most effective weapons systems got their start that way, at grass-roots level, just as some of Ukraine's most effective drones have done.

(Of course, sometimes the inexperience of developers and manufacturers caused hiccups in the process.  A very effective armored personnel carrier was developed as an independent design, and a small engineering firm got the contract to produce two full-scale prototypes for military testing.  They were supplied with special armor steel plates to build them.  Unfortunately, their workers somehow mixed up the steel plates, so when the first prototype was tested against standard enemy weapons and ammunition, they penetrated the bodywork without any difficulty.  The firm had to pay for a replacement set of steel panels and build another prototype for testing, which almost bankrupted it - although the vehicle did make it into production, and served very successfully.  A rueful engineer who told me the tale commented that, somewhere out there on an African farm, the farmer had trailers to tow behind his tractors that were as bullet-proof and landmine-proof as a trailer could get, because that's where the first consignment of armor steel plates ended up!)

I foresaw this problem with US drone development and production in a recent article in these pages.  This interview reinforces my perspective on the problem.  I wonder if the US defense establishment is able - or even willing - to loosen its death grip on procurement, to make room for this sort of innovation and rapid development?

Peter