Is this China's perspective on the Ukraine war?

 

Strategy Page has an interesting analysis of what China's position appears to be on the war in Ukraine.  It's part of a larger, longer article discussing the war in general and President Putin's position in particular.

Officially, China supports Russian efforts to deal with “Ukrainian aggression.” Unofficially, China is critical of the Russian war on Ukraine, if only because of the negative impact on Chinese trade and diplomacy. China was a major customer for Ukrainian military tech and wheat. That trade is disrupted and will take a while to recover, no matter who wins.

There were other problems. China was not happy with the poor performance of Russian troops in Ukraine. China was kept informed about the preparations for the invasion and asked Russia to wait until the Winter Olympics in China were over on February 23rd before invading. The invasion began before dawn on the 24th and was, according to Russia, supposed to be over in fifteen days. After about a week, China concluded that the Russian plan and the Russian military had failed. Russian troops quickly ran into trouble because of the unexpected stiff resistance by Ukrainian troops and armed civilians. China initially remained silent about the invasion and as the Ukrainian resistance increased, along with unprecedented sanctions imposed by Russia’s Western trading partners, China refused to openly support the Russian operation. China was also dismayed at the degree of European military support for the Ukrainians, despite Russian threats of nuclear retaliation. That did not dissuade the Europeans or Americans, just as it had not worked on China during their 1969 border war between Russia and China. In 1969 China had recently tested its first nuclear weapon but did not have a nuclear retaliation capability. Russia approached the Americans about joining in a nuclear attack on China. The Americans refused and criticized the Russian threats to use nukes. When China found out about that, there was a warming in the long-frosty relations with the Americans which soon (1972) led to the U.S. recognizing the Chinese communist government.

The Chinese consider themselves more astute students of history than Russians and now believe that the invasion was poorly planned and carried out. China is more willing to acknowledge problems with readiness and training in their own military, lessons that Russia appears to have forgotten. Any perceived Chinese support of this Russian disaster causes problems for China, as well as inspiring the Chinese military to pay more attention to avoiding the Russian approach.

China is not assisting Russia economically, unless it benefits China. To do otherwise would be expensive, reward Russian bad judgment and imply Chinese approval of the Ukrainian operation. With no Chinese economic lifeline available, Russia is under more pressure to end the Ukraine operation as soon as possible. The Russian plan was to rush in and occupy key areas, like the capital Kyiv and all Ukrainian ports, and then declare the war ended and call for negotiations. That didn’t work but opposition inside Russia did appear. Many prominent Russians have risked arrest by openly criticizing the invasion. China has less openly agreed with these critics by refusing to rescue Putin and the Russian economy. China has also been investing more money in its “lost territories” in Pacific Coast Russia. More Chinese are coming into these territories to live and do business while, since the 1990s, more Russians left. China expected to eventually take control of the lost territories economically and with a lot of Chinese residents. The Ukraine-related sanctions have sped up this process.

The Russian invasion is something China warned against because it was reckless, something China avoids at all costs. Now that the Russian invasion has failed and produced unprecedented economic sanctions, China is making the most of that and forcing Russia to be even more dependent on China. For example, Russia was able to use the Chinese credit card network and a new China controlled international banking system. This system is still small and new members tend to be outlaw states, but it’s a start. Ukraine, which has done a lot of business with China over the last decade, is aware that China could order Russia to halt their invasion and deal with the aftermath via negotiations. It suits China to allow Russia to weaken itself further and become more dependent on China. This is their long-range strategy to defeat Russia and retrieve the Pacific coast territory lost to the Russian monarchy centuries ago. For the moment China goes along with the Russian version of the war, in which Russia is simply defending itself from NATO aggression. China intends to be the only winner in this war and so far, that is happening.

There's more at the link.

I've been wondering how China sees the Ukraine war, and what advantage(s) it can garner from it.  I think the speedy, united action of the West against Russia has disconcerted Xi's government.  I think they thought they could mount a military takeover of Taiwan with little or no reaction from the West;  but the Ukraine war has shown them that such negative reaction is very likely, and may cost them dear in economic (if not military) terms.  China may now adopt a "waiting game" until it can absorb Taiwan peacefully.

The other, and perhaps more important, consideration for China is its long-standing desire to recover the Pacific coastal territory seized from it by Russia under the Tsars, centuries ago.  There's also the immense storehouse of raw materials, including vast quantities of oil, in Siberia and the east of Russia.  China already dominates those provinces economically;  without Chinese investment and manpower, they'd have shriveled up and died, in practical terms.  In many ways, they're as good as Chinese colonies already.  The dismal performance of the Russian armed forces may have persuaded China that if it really wanted or needed those provinces, it could probably seize them by a coup de main without worrying too much about a conventional military response.  The big question, of course, is whether Russia would resort to nuclear weapons, despite the threat of Chinese nuclear retaliation.  That's a horse of an entirely different color.

Furthermore, if I were in North Korea, I'd be considering my options very carefully right now.  Suddenly China has bigger things to worry about than encouraging a North Korean gadfly to irritate the United States.  Their support for that paranoid, insular, isolated regime now has, I'm sure, a lot lower priority than it once did.  China is entirely capable of deciding, in a fit of irritation, that it's had enough of that minor distraction, and forcing regime change on North Korea whether that country likes it or not.

Interesting times . . .

Peter