Building an Afghan army - one man's approach

I've written on several previous occasions about the quagmire in which the US risks becoming bogged down in Afghanistan. Invaders and occupiers have tried to pacify the region for well over two millennia, and none have succeeded.

I was therefore interested to read the approach taken by Prof. Sean McFate to rebuild the Liberian army, and his thoughts on how this experience might be applied in Afghanistan. Here's an excerpt from his article in Foreign Affairs.

When I arrived in Liberia in 2004, the country's army was, at best, a mess. After decades of civil war, soldiers' hands were as bloodied as any rebels'. The troops were undisciplined, unpaid, and undertrained. They were a motley crew that protected no one in a country where pretty much everyone was vulnerable to violence. And it was our job to turn them into a professional military.

Today, just five years later, Liberia's soldiers are among the best in the region. They have been vetted, trained, paid, and readied for action. The difference was the impact of that little-known U.S. initiative -- the first of its kind -- that literally rebuilt the Liberian army from scratch. Our goal was for the Liberian army to fill the role of U.N. peacekeepers as the latter were slowly phased out, and it worked astonishingly well.

Now that model might be of use again. President Barack Obama's strategy for Afghanistan is predicated on creating Afghan security forces to replace coalition soldiers. The idea of training local troops to replace U.S. or international ones is not a new one; the United States famously tried to do it and failed in Vietnam. More recently, in 2005, then-President George W. Bush outlined his plan for Iraq and the aim that "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Yet the United States' ability to raise foreign forces has been paltry. This is because raising an army is difficult and dangerous: Do it too well and it might turn into a Praetorian Guard or a vehicle for a coup d'état. Do the job poorly and it could terrorize the citizens it is sworn to protect and much worse.

Today the stage is Afghanistan -- a near-failed state controlled by a weak central government, essentially devoid of basic infrastructure. The lessons of Liberia may help. Both countries are relatively underdeveloped and have a war-ravaged modern history. What's more, Afghans and Liberians both lack a sense of national identity as such and often identify first by ethnic group and second as Afghan or Liberian. These factors are challenges for creating a national army in a place where the majority of the population is illiterate, tribal or local loyalties trump patriotic allegiance, and ethnic blood feuds are ancient and deep.

Here, then, is an account of some of the decisions and obstacles we wrestled with in Liberia -- an experience that taught me the challenges of creating soldiers and policemen whom children run toward for protection, rather than away from in fear.

Our starting point was to tackle the big-picture questions whose answers are far too often assumed: How big will the army be? What will it do? What are the threats? What should be done with the existing army, which was a perpetrator in the civil war? Few had ever disbanded a standing African army and lived to tell about it.

Understandably, American trainers tend to replicate the U.S. military model when they help train militaries abroad. But our team knew that the task would be less about "train and equip" than reimagine entirely. It meant transforming the security sector into a professional, effective, legitimate, and accountable pillar of society. It also meant creating civilian-led institutions to manage the soldiers, such as ministries of interior, defense, and justice. These forces and institutions had to be organized around a national security strategy that would address the root causes of conflict.

. . .

Our force reimagined, we began to recruit for it.

First, we had to make sure that the new military did not end up like that last one: engaged in widespread human rights violations. This required extensive human rights vetting of each recruit, which is also mandated by the "Leahy Law," named after Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, which prohibits U.S. assistance to foreign militaries that abuse human rights. Perhaps needless to say, meeting this requirement is hard to do in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, where it is difficult for U.S. troops to know who is shady and who is clean. In both countries, insurgents have infiltrated the police and military, committing atrocities in uniform that quickly discredit the new security force in the eyes of the populace. It's a reputation not easily undone.




. . .

A lot more work than many realize went into recruiting, paying, and training Liberia's new professional army. Here are a few lessons learned from Liberia that might help in Afghanistan:

§ It might be necessary to start over. Security forces that are distrusted and feared by the population can be worse than no security at all. Disband corrupt units completely and invite soldiers or policemen to reapply individually so that they can be vetted. Also, ensure the public is involved in the vetting to help re-establish the force's credibility.

§ All institutions must rise together. It is dangerous to raise a capable army that the Finance Ministry cannot pay. This is a coup d'état in the waiting.

§ Modern warfare is more than shooting. Incorporate literacy and respect for the rule of law and human rights directly into basic training. Also, take every training opportunity to imbue a sense of national identity into the force to overcome parochial tribal allegiances, and don't let any one ethnic group dominate the ranks.

§ Don't create a force so strong it provokes the neighbors to build up their own militaries in response. In Afghanistan and Liberia, the AK-47 is the weapon of mass destruction, and arms races often lead to bloodshed.

§ Lastly, as foreigners, be humble. Afghanistan and Liberia are worlds away from the United States, yet the country still creates "mini-me" versions of the U.S. military and police abroad. Throw away the American playbook and think creatively, in partnership with Afghans, about what is truly needed to defend them from their threats. It won't look like Fort Bragg.

There's more at the link.

Interesting . . . and as a veteran of military service in Africa, with a fairly thorough knowledge of that continent's armed forces, I think there are points to be made both for and against Prof. McFate's approach. In the specific situation he encountered in Liberia, I think he did remarkably well. Whether or not such an approach can be transplanted to Afghanistan is a matter of opinion, of course, but I think the authorities there could do worse than examine the Liberian case study to see what they might be able to learn and apply. Certainly, their present approach doesn't seem to be working very well!

Peter