The 'War On Drugs' heats up

The Center for a New American Security has just released an 80-page report on the drug-fueled crisis confronting the US and other countries. Ares reports:

The report, 'Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security', says the current threat from drug gangs throughout much of the Americas is nothing short of a “criminal insurgency in the Western Hemisphere.” The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released the 80-page study in Washington Thursday (Sept. 30).

Written by Robert Killebrew, a retired U.S. Army colonel, and Jennifer Bernal, a CNAS researcher, it says interlocking narcotics cartels operate within 14 sovereign nations in the Americas and pose a threat to civil society in those countries.

But the report says the insurgency should not be viewed as an attempt to take over a government – but rather a drive to destabilize it and destroy its credibility with its citizens – making it easier to do business. The study notes narcotics money fueled -- and corrupted -- the 30-year insurgency in Colombia by the FARC guerrillas. With U.S. assistance and perseverance in Bogota, the Colombian government has started to stabilize the country.

The risk to the U.S. doesn't stop at the Mexican border, the reports says, noting Mexican drug cartels operate “branch offices” in more than 230 U.S. and Canadian cities. The Salvadoran gang, MS-13, operates in 30 U.S. states.

“Whatever national strategy is developed to counter the cartel insurgency, the focus must ultimately include supporting local police departments and the cop on the beat, who confronts the gangs every day,” the report declared.

Unlike Mexico or Colombia, where there has been open warfare between drug gangs and the government, there is no counter insurgency role within U.S. borders for the U.S. Military, says Killebrew, a former Special Forces officer and Airborne commander. However, the U.S. Military can support and train militaries and law enforcement agencies in other countries – although with a light footprint. It's better for the U.S. to train locals in intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance than to do it for them, he adds.

There's more at the link.

The full report may be read here. It's long, but well worth your time, if this is a subject of interest to you. I'll highlight the reports' conclusions, and leave you to read the authors' reasons for them in the report.

Five conclusions emerge from the study.

First, crime, terrorism and insurgency are interwoven in new and dangerous ways that threaten not just the welfare but also the security of societies in the Western Hemisphere. Scale and the capability to destabilize governments have made the cartels an insurgent threat as well as a criminal one. The United States must lead a hemisphere-wide effort to confront and defeat the cartels’ threat to civil society.

Second, the huge geographic scope of the criminal networks makes this challenge multinational. Cartels operate in at least 14 sovereign countries, each with its own culture, economy, government, law enforcement, justice and military establishment, transportation hubs and routes. Cartel operations also vary widely, so U.S. and other states’ responses must become as adaptable as the criminal insurgencies they confront. Governments must leverage international and regional organizations to bridge gaps and ensure continuity of operations from state to state.

Third, any U.S. strategic effort must include appropriate assistance to Latin American states to strengthen security and law enforcement institutions. The ultimate response to terrorism and insurgency is the rule of law, and justice under the law, for people who may feel they have never had a fair shake from the government in question. Colombia’s war against insurgents and drug cartels teaches us that strong, democratic states operating legally and transparently can secure the backing of their people and ultimately the rejection of criminality. Local military or police forces must defeat the cartel insurgents and break them, by successive police operations, into smaller and smaller groups until they can be either incarcerated or reintegrated into civil life. U.S. aid, discretely [sic] managed and responsive to host country requirements, can be vitally important in providing the training, equipment and support for developing law enforcement capabilities for governments fighting cartels. While the cartels and their allies represent a new kind of transnational threat, the United States has been building its capability to fight such threats since before 9/11, and has increased its capabilities markedly since then. Likewise, countries like Colombia, with discrete [sic] U.S. support, have achieved notable success against narco-guerrillas and cartels.

Fourth, the United States must focus on cleaning its own house. America should support more effective policing operations against cartels, effectively reduce the use of illegal drugs, and fight to reduce the influence of gang culture, particularly in schools and among young people. The United States is fortunate to have generally effective, uncorrupted police forces, but the unique nature of its federal system makes coordination and information-sharing among police agencies a challenge. This must be overcome. A comprehensive national strategy encompassing enforcement, treatment, prison reform and other measures can cut back the flow of cash to the cartels and the gangs, and at the same time reduce their malign impact on civil society. At the same time, the U.S. government must fight to reduce the influence of gangs on U.S. youth cultures, particularly in schools, where gangs are now recruiting at younger and younger ages. Some communities have forged successful strategies against drug gangs; police departments, notably in Los Angeles, Northern Virginia and New York, have shown that counter-gang strategies can work. Public attitudes can be changed by persistent and skillful messaging; a generation that can reduce legal smoking, with a powerful industry lobby, should be able to reduce the use of harmful, illegal drugs and the attraction of gangs.

Fifth, defeating the cartels and their allies will take a long time. Defeating the cartels, and ensuring future security among the countries in the Americas, means dismantling their networks and driving down their impact to levels that can be handled by local law enforcement organizations. Doing so is a long-term proposition and will require continuous effort by a series of American administrations, in a manner similar to U.S. support for Colombia and decades-long interdiction programs. As summarized by one experienced agent, “There’s no abridged time line.” Both interdiction and bilateral cooperation efforts have certainly achieved some success. During past decades U.S. law enforcement agencies like the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is operationally engaged in 86 foreign countries and a broad range of law enforcement activities, have learned to operate with police organizations of other states, giving the United States a good start on attacking the cartels directly. Other policies – such as helping friendly governments improve judicial procedures, or assisting with military counterinsurgency and economic policies to address the underlying causes of lawlessness – will take longer. There have been successes in the long struggle against criminal insurgencies. Cartels can be defeated. Thus, there is reason for optimism, provided the United States engages now.

Interesting conclusions - some of them perhaps impracticable, given the realities of politics, social structures and the boundaries between Federal, State and local government in the US. My reactions to them, in order, are as follows:

1. The cartels pose a threat to civil society largely in proportion to the degree of instability and corruption in that society. Where society is stable and (relatively) honest, the cartels won't make much headway. Where society itself is run for the benefit of the few, by enslaving (in economic terms) and controlling the many, the latter will probably lend at least passive, if not active support to any movement (criminal or otherwise) that offers them a better alternative.
2. Yes, it's a multinational challenge, but it's not confined to the Western Hemisphere or the Americas. We know that Iran is actively involved in Venezuela; that Al Qaeda is actively involved in the Tri-Border area of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina; and that Hezbollah is active in the same region (and probably working together with Al Qaeda). With such pro-terrorism and anti-US groups active in South America, what am I bet that their representatives are already in contact with the drug cartels, to discuss operations of mutual interest? Where drugs can be smuggled, so can terrorists. Where drug cartels need their enemies 'dealt with', terrorist movements can provide well-trained and -armed operatives to 'take care of business'. It's a natural alliance, and it extends well into the Middle East and South-East Asia. Just how we're to deal with that, I'm not sure.
3. Latin American security and law enforcement institutions are often corrupt beyond redemption. Mexico is the most blatant example (look up for yourself how many cops in that nation have been arrested and/or fired for betraying their office and working for the drug cartels. The numbers are well into five figures.) Other nations aren't much better. Sure, there are some countries and security agencies that are very good: but they also tend to be those that haven't yet faced a major internal drug problem. Once billions of dollars in drug money become available to fund corruption in new areas, who's to say whether the 'good' agencies will stay that way?
4. It doesn't matter how good the official, co-ordinated response of the US may be to the threat posed by the cartels. So long as the demand for drugs exists in America, others will seek to fulfil that demand, for their own profit. All official efforts can achieve is to slow down the shipments, disrupt distribution arrangements, and inconvenience traffickers. We've been officially fighting the 'War On Drugs' since President Nixon first used the term back in 1971. Thirty-nine years later, drugs are still as freely available as ever, albeit at higher prices in a few markets. If all our efforts (and the billions upon billions of dollars spent on them) have produced such meager fruit, who's to say that a better co-ordinated response will achieve any greater success?
5. To say that defeating the cartels will take a very long time is the understatement oof the year, so far! We can't defeat them at all unless and until we address the problem of domestic demand for illegal narcotics. As long as that demand exists, and addicts can pay for what they want, there will always be those who'll seek to profit at their expense, and do anything and everything necessary to defend their income.
   

What say you, readers? Let's hear from you in Comments.

Peter